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Abstract: 
Prompted by two of the premises of feminist judgment-writing projects – that feminist 
judgments are relatively rare in the ‘real world’, and that they make a valuable contribution 
to jurisprudence and to the quality of justice – this article explores feminist judgment writing 
on the UK Supreme Court. Drawing on a database of over 570 cases, the article investigates 
who writes feminist judgments on the UK Supreme Court, what kind of feminist judgments 
they write, and what the feminist judgments add to the Court’s jurisprudence and the quality 
of justice it dispenses. It finds that among judges employing feminist reasoning, Lady Hale 
was by far the most active, but she was not alone, with Lords Kerr and Wilson also writing 
several feminist judgments. A range of different type of feminist reasoning was deployed and 
feminist judgments generally did constitute better judging, although their impact tended to 
be more discursive than substantive. The article concludes by considering the implications of 
these findings for both feminist debates and for the UK Supreme Court and the litigants 





Feminist Judgments on the UK Supreme Court 
Rosemary Hunter and Erika Rackley*  
 
Introduction 
It is fair to say that feminist judgment writing has taken the academic world by storm. 
Scholars in Canada, the UK, Northern/Ireland, Australia, the USA, New Zealand, Scotland, 
India, Africa and in international law have re-written judgments in their jurisdictions from a 
feminist perspective.1 The feminist judgments they have produced are informed by a 
feminist consciousness, feminist theory, feminist values and/or feminist methods, and aim 
to be inclusive of women’s lives and experiences (and often the lives and experiences of 
others traditionally marginalized from the law) and to achieve gender justice  .2  
The feminist judgment projects as a whole aim to show how cases could – and should 
– have been decided differently. One of the foundational premises of these projects is that 
                                                   
* Erika Rackley gratefully acknowledges the support of the Philip Leverhulme Trust (PLP-2014-193).  
1. Women’s Court of Canada, “Special Issue: Rewriting Equality” (2006) 18:1 Canadian Journal of Women and 
the Law 1; Rosemary Hunter, Claire McGlynn & Erika Rackley, eds, Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010); Heather Douglas et al, eds, Australian Feminist Judgments: Righting and Re-
Writing Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014); Kathryn M Stanchi, Linda L Berger & Bridget J Crawford, eds, 
Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Opinions of the United States Supreme Court (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2016); Máiréad Enright, Julie McCandless & Aoife O’Donoghue, eds, Northern/Irish Feminist Judgments: 
Judges’ Troubles and the Gendered Politics of Identity (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017); Elisabeth McDonald et al, 
eds, Feminist Judgments of Aotearoa/New Zealand: Te Rino - A Two-Stranded Rope (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2017); Bridget J Crawford & Anthony C Infanti, eds, Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017); Women’s Court of Canada, “Rewriting Equality II” (2018) 30:2 Canadian 
Journal of Women and the Law 197; Loveday Hodson & Troy Lavers, eds, Feminist Judgments in International 
Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2019); Sharon Cowan, Chloë Kennedy & Vanessa E Munro, eds, Scottish Feminist 
Judgments: (Re)Creating Law from the Outside In (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2019); Feminist Judgments Project: 
India: https://fjpindia.wixsite.com/fjpi; African Feminist Judgments Project: 
https://www.lawandglobaljustice.com/the-african-feminist-judgments-project/.  
2. See further Rosemary Hunter, “Can Feminist Judges Make a Difference?” (2008) 15 International Journal of 





feminist judging does not occur sufficiently often in the ‘real world’3 – hence, there are many 
decided cases calling out for feminist rewriting, and the projects aim to model feminist 
judgment-writing for the benefit and future reference of ‘real world’ judges.4 The other 
foundational premise is that feminist judging is valuable. Judgments taking a feminist 
approach are likely to be more informed about what is at stake and more inclusive of the 
breadth of human experience than those not adopting such an approach.5 Feminist judging 
is not a form of bias but a method of correcting existing biases and blind spots in 
adjudication.6 It involves judging ethically, with care and responsibility, and improves the 
quality of justice by delivering judgments which do not simply reinforce existing 
configurations of power, privilege and domination.  
Yet while the production of fictional feminist judgments has blossomed, there has 
been little systematic investigation of the extent to which and the ways in which 
recognizably feminist judgments are being written in the ‘real world’. There is a small but 
growing literature exploring the feminism – and feminist judgment writing – of ‘real world’ 
judges,7 but this literature has focused on individual judges rather than courts. This article 
                                                   
3. The scare quotes around ‘real world’ indicate that the term refers to only one (conventional) understanding 
of reality. There is a sense in which the feminist judges and judgments of the feminist judgment projects are 
equally ‘real’. See also Hunter, “Feminist Judging in the ‘Real World’”, supra n 2. 
4. See Diana Majury, “Introducing the Women’s Court of Canada” (2006) 18:1 Canadian Journal of Women and 
the Law 1 at 2.  
5. Brenda Hale, “A Minority Opinion?” (2008) 154 Proceedings of the British Academy 319; Hunter, “Can 
Feminist Judges Make a Difference?”, supra n 2. 
6. Rosemary Hunter, “Can Feminist Judges Make a Difference?”, supra n 2 at 15-27; Rosemary Hunter, “An 
Account of Feminist Judging” in Hunter, McGlynn & Rackley, eds, Feminist Judgments, supra n 1, 30 at 30-35.  
7. E.g. Susanna Sherry, “Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication” (1986) 72 Virginia 
Law Review 543; Judith O Brown, Wendy E Parmet & Mary E O’Connell, “The Rugged Feminism of Sandra Day 
O’Connor” (1999) 32 Indiana Law Review 1219; Elizabeth Sheehy, ed, Adding Feminism to Law: The 
Contributions of Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2004); Beverley Baines, “But Was She a 
Feminist Judge?” in Kim Brooks, ed, Justice Bertha Wilson: One Woman’s Difference (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
2010) 211; Rosemary Hunter, “Justice Marcia Neave: Case Study of a Feminist Judge” in Ulrike Schultz & Gisela 
Shaw, eds, Gender and Judging (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013) 399; Heather Douglas & Francesca Bartlett, 
“Practice and Persuasion: Women, Feminism and Judicial Diversity” in Rebecca Ananian-Welsh & Jonathan 
Crowe, eds, Judicial Independence in Australia: Contemporary Challenges, Future Directions (Sydney: 
Federation Press, 2016) 76; Rosemary Hunter & Danielle Tyson, “Justice Betty King: A Study of Feminist Judging 




contributes to and extends that literature by presenting a systematic analysis of feminist 
judgment writing on the UK Supreme Court (UKSC). Our aim has not been to quantify the 
exact proportion of UKSC cases which include feminist judgments. Rather, we set out to 
answer three questions: firstly, who writes feminist judgments on the UKSC? Lady Hale, the 
Court’s current President, is well known as a feminist judge and author of feminist 
judgments, but is she the only member of the Court writing feminist judgments? Secondly, 
what does feminist judging on the UKSC look like? What strands of feminism or different 
feminist approaches are evident in the Court’s feminist judgments? Thirdly, what (if any) 
value do the feminist judgments identified add to the UKSC’s decision-making? While we 
have asked these questions of the UKSC, the methodology we adopted to answer them 
could clearly be applied to other courts, as well as individual judges.  
The article begins with a description of our methodology which involved first 
identifying a sub-set of cases for analysis which were most likely to give rise to instances of 
feminist judging, and then engaging in close textual analysis of all the judgments in those 
cases to identify any feminist reasoning. We go on to detail our findings in terms of which 
judges employed feminist reasoning in those cases, the types of feminist reasoning 
discovered, and the extent to which feminist reasoning might be said to have ‘added value’ 
to the Court’s jurisprudence and the quality of justice dispensed. We conclude by 
considering the implications of our findings, and further questions that arise, in relation to 
both debates within feminist legal scholarship, and the future of feminist judgment-writing 







The UK Supreme Court 
The UKSC was established in 2009 at the apex of the court system of the United Kingdom. It 
is the final court of appeal for civil cases in the UK and for criminal cases in England, Wales 
and Northern Ireland.8 Prior to its establishment, final appellate jurisdiction in the UK was 
exercised by the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords. However as a Committee of 
the House of Lords, its members were also part of the legislature, entitled to sit in the House 
of Lords in its legislative capacity. The advent of the Supreme Court was designed to effect 
full constitutional separation between the legislature and the judiciary.  
The Court has twelve members, but unlike many other apex courts it does not sit en 
banc. Cases are usually heard by a panel of five Justices, although in certain cases raising 
issues of high legal, constitutional or public importance, the size of the panel is increased to 
seven, nine or exceptionally eleven Justices.9 Panels for individual cases are constituted on 
the basis of a combination of expertise, workload/availability, and any perceived need for 
balance among Justices who might take different views on an issue.10 Draft panels are drawn 
up by the Court’s Registrar and approved by the President and Deputy President. The 
smaller size of panels and differing combinations of Justices mean that judicial conversations 
and opportunities for persuasion vary between cases. Nevertheless, the court has tended to 
                                                   
8. Under the terms of Scottish devolution, criminal cases are finally decided in the Scottish courts rather than by 
the UK Supreme Court. 
9. See the panel numbers criteria at https://www.supremecourt.uk/procedures/panel-numbers-criteria.html. 
To date the court has sat as a panel of eleven Justices only twice, in the two Brexit cases: R (on the application 
of Miller and another) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, [2017] UKSC 5; R (on the application 
of Miller) v The Prime Minister [2019] UKSC 41. Note that members of the Supreme Court also sit on the Privy 
Council, which is the final court of appeal for a number of British Commonwealth countries. Our analysis 
relates only to UK Supreme Court decisions and not to Privy Council decisions. 
10. Alan Paterson, Final Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013) at 
72. See also Graham Gee et al., The Politics of Judicial Independence in the UK’s Changing Constitution 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) at 199; Rosemary Hunter & Erika Rackley, “Judicial Leadership 




exhibit high levels of agreement, with seventy-seven percent of cases in 2009-15, for 
example, being decided unanimously.11  
Until very recently only one woman – Lady Hale – had ever sat on the Court.12 She 
was joined in 2017 by Lady Black, and in 2018 by Lady Arden. Hale was appointed Deputy 
President of the Court in 2013 and became its President in September 2017. She will leave 
the Court when she reaches the statutory retirement age of seventy-five in January 2020. At 
that point, the Court will revert to only two woman Justices as Hale will be replaced by a 
man.13  
Lady Hale is a prominent and self-identified feminist judge.14 Her feminist ‘set 
pieces’– often, though not always, in cases involving ‘women’s issues’ – are well known and 
widely discussed.15 But this does not necessarily mean there is, or has been, only one writer 
                                                   
11. Authors’ data. For some periods within this timeframe the level of unanimity was even higher – under the 
leadership of Lord Neuberger as President and Lord Hope as Deputy President it was eighty-two percent. See 
also Paterson, Final Judgment, supra n 10 at 113, who notes that the UK Supreme Court was more likely to be 
unanimous than the Canadian Supreme Court, the High Court of Australia or the US Supreme Court. Tom Poole 
& Sangeeta Shah, “The Law Lords and Human Rights” (2011) 74 Modern Law Review 79 at 87 show a similar 
level of unanimity on the House of Lords. 
12. Lady Hale sat alone on the House of Lords and subsequently the UK Supreme Court for almost fourteen 
years.  
13. Three Supreme Court Justices will retire in 2020: Lady Hale, Lord Wilson and Lord Carnwath. In July 2019 the 
Ministry of Justice announced their replacements as (in order): Lord Justice Nicholas Hamblen, Lord Justice 
George Leggatt (both from the Court of Appeal for England and Wales) and Professor Andrew Burrows (Oxford 
University). 
14. See, e.g., Hale, “A Minority Opinion?”, supra n 5. In her earlier academic career, Hale co-authored the first 
English textbook on women and law: Susan Atkins & Brenda Hoggett, Women and the Law (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1984; reissued London: Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 2018, available at https://humanities-
digital-library.org/index.php/hdl/catalog/book/atkins_hoggett). 
15. A ‘set piece’ is a judgment in which the judge makes a deliberate statement comprehensively setting out her 
or his (different) approach to the issue in dispute. (The term is derived from the sporting arena where it refers 
to situations in which tactics and routines are worked out in training in advance of matches and played out on 
the field according to the set plan.) For examples of Hale’s feminist ‘set piece’ judgments, see, e.g., Parkinson v 
St James and Seacroft Hospital NHS Trust, [2001] EWCA Civ 560; K v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department; Fornah v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2006] UKHL 46; Radmacher v Granatino, 
[2010] UKSC 42; Yemshaw v London Borough of Hounslow, [2011] UKSC 3; R (on the application of McDonald) v 
Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, [2011] UKSC 33; Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board, [2015] 
UKSC 11. See discussion in Erika Rackley, “Difference in the House of Lords” (2006) 15 Social and Legal Studies 
163; Nicolette Priaulx, The Harm Paradox: Tort Law and the Unwanted Child in an Era of Choice (London: 
Routledge-Cavendish, 2007); Erika Rackley, “What a Difference Difference Makes: Gendered Harms and Judicial 
Diversity” (2008) 15 International Journal of the Legal Profession 37; Brigitte Clark, “Ante-Nuptial Contracts 




of feminist judgments on the UKSC bench. Not all feminist judgments are written by self-
declared feminists. Indeed, one of the dangers of looking for feminist decision-making in the 
judgments of someone who is avowedly feminist is the risk of confirmation bias: you find 
(only) what you are looking for. Nor are feminist judgments necessarily written by women, 
just as not all women judges will write feminist judgments. Hence, in order to answer our 
first question about who writes feminist judgments on the UKSC, this article does not focus 
only on Lady Hale’s high profile feminist judgments, but rather draws on a systematic 
analysis of all UKSC cases decided from the Court’s inception in 2009 to the end of Lord 
Neuberger’s Presidency in 2017.16 Taking this approach, we find that half of the Justices 
authored or co-authored a judgment that included feminist reasoning. As expected, Lady 
Hale is exceptional, making the largest contribution to feminist judgment writing during the 
period. However, two other Justices, Lords Kerr and Wilson, also wrote feminist judgments 
with some frequency.  
 
Methodology: Identifying Feminist Judgments 
Our primary database consisted of all decisions issued by the Supreme Court over an almost 
eight-year period from its inception in October 2009 to the end of Lord Neuberger’s 
Presidency. Lord Neuberger retired in August 2017, and the last decision by the Court under 
his Presidency (Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v DSD and another, [2018] UKSC 11) 
was issued in February 2018. This amounted to a total of 571 decisions.17  
                                                   
George, “In Defence of Dissent: R (McDonald) v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea” [2011] Family Law 
1097; Erika Rackley, Women, Judging and the Judiciary: From Difference to Diversity (London: Routledge, 2013) 
36; Robert Heywood & Jose Miola, “The Changing Face of Pre-Operative Medical Disclosure: Placing the Patient 
at the Heart of the Matter” (2017) 133 Law Quarterly Review 296. 
 
16. The article thus does not consider the possible effect on the Court of having a feminist President, although 
we intend to investigate this question in future work. 




Our previous theoretical analysis of and empirical research on ‘real world’ feminist 
judgments suggested that, while feminist legal scholarship has developed analyses of just 
about every area of law, this does not mean that feminist judgments are likely to be 
encountered in every area of law.18 Rather, practical opportunities for feminist judging are 
most likely to arise in cases that at least potentially raise feminist or gender issues (defined 
below). Although feminist judgments may be written in cases not raising such issues, 
previous experience suggested that finding such judgments was akin to searching for a 
needle in a haystack. The time-consuming and intensive work involved in closely reading 
every judgment issued by the Court would yield little benefit in terms of the identification of 
feminist judgments. We therefore focused our in-depth qualitative analysis on the subset of 
cases we identified as raising feminist/gender issues. In so doing, we may have missed some 
feminist reasoning in other cases, but we are likely to have captured the bulk of feminist 
reasoning adopted by members of the Court, in terms of both its occurrence and range.  
From our dataset of 571 cases we identified 114 cases raising (potentially) feminist or 
gender issues, as described below. We undertook close readings of these cases, making a 
note of the specific factual issues and legal questions raised, the result, the Justices on the 
case and their role in the decision, whether any feminist reasoning was used, and if so, 
whether this was in a leading, concurring or dissenting judgment, and the type of reasoning 
adopted. We recorded the reasoning adopted by each Justice in detail and produced a 
summary table of the cases to allow for category counts, cross-referencing, and comparison.  
 
  
                                                   
18. For specific discussion of this point, see Hunter, ‘Justice Marcia Neave’, supra n 7. And see further Hunter, 





The aim of creating our subset of ‘feminist/gender’ cases was essentially pragmatic – to 
enable us to focus our in-depth analysis of judgments in an informed and productive way. 
Consequently, we did not aim to reify the feminist/gender category, to draw hard and fast 
boundaries around it, or to make strong claims about the proportion of UKSC cases which 
fell within it. We took a deliberately expansive approach to the identification of cases which 
raised actual or potential feminist or gender issues, and in cases of doubt, erred on the side 
of inclusion. The fact that others might disagree with our choices around the margins does 
not affect the validity of our analysis. 
 We included cases in our subset if they fell within one (or more) of four possible 
groups: ‘feminist’, ‘gender’, ‘potentially feminist’ and ‘potentially gender’ cases.  Cases 
raised a ‘feminist’ issue when they involved the situation of women collectively (as a class),19 
or a subject central to feminist theory. This group included cases relating to mothering and 
family relationships,20 gender-based and sexual violence,21 sexually transmitted debt,22 sex 
or pregnancy discrimination and equal pay,23 family property,24 autonomy and women’s 
                                                   
19. As opposed to simply involving individual women. Thus, the fact that one or both of the parties were women 
did not necessarily make a case ‘feminist’.  
20. E.g. In the matter of E (Children), [2011] UKSC 27; R (on the application of Quila and another) v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department, [2011] UKSC 45; In the Matter of S (a Child), [2012] UKSC 10; BH and another v 
The Lord Advocate and another (Scotland), [2012] UKSC 24; HH v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, 
Genoa, [2012] UKSC 25; ANS and another v ML (Scotland), [2012] UKSC 30; In the matter of J (Children), [2013] 
UKSC 9; R (on the application of Agyarko) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2017] UKSC 11. 
21. E.g. Yemshaw v London Borough of Hounslow, [2011] UKSC 3; R v Brown (Northern Ireland), [2013] UKSC 43; 
Michael and others v Chief Constable of South Wales Police and another, [2015] UKSC 2. 
22. Royal Bank of Scotland v John Patrick McCormack Wilson and another (Scotland), [2010] UKSC 50; AB v Her 
Majesty’s Advocate (Scotland), [2017] UKSC 25. 
23. Jessy Saint-Prix v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, [2012] UKSC 49; North and others v Dumfries and 
Galloway Council (Scotland), [2013] UKSC 45; South Lanarkshire Council v The Scottish Information 
Commissioner, [2013] UKSC 55; Mirga v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, [2016] UKSC 1; Samin v 
Westminster City Council, [2016] UKSC 1. 
24. E.g. Jones v Kernott, [2011] UKSC 53; Gow v Grant (Scotland), [2012] UKSC 29; Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd, 




bodies,25 trafficking and labour exploitation of women,26 and access to reproductive 
services.27 It also included cases which addressed areas of feminist concern such as 
marriage, care, and dependency..28 In R (on the application of Johnson) v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, [2016] UKSC 56, for example, while the substantive issue 
concerned whether the Secretary of State was able to deport a Jamaican citizen following his 
release from prison, the fact that this was an issue at all was the result of the valourization 
of marriage.29 Johnson was born in Jamaica to an unmarried Jamaican mother and British 
father in the mid-1980s. Under the law at the time of his birth he was a Jamaican citizen. He 
had moved to the UK with his father when he was four, but neither he, nor his father on his 
behalf, had applied for British citizenship. Had Johnson’s parents been married when he was 
born, or had married later, or had his mother been the parent with British citizenship, he 
would not have needed to do so. He would have been a British citizen not liable to 
deportation, whatever his criminal activity. His purported removal was therefore “based 
solely on the accident of [his] birth outside wedlock”, and as such, the Court held, was 
unlawfully discriminatory under Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights.30 
Cases raised gender issues when they concerned men collectively (as a class) and/or 
differences between men and women, such as the assumed roles of mothers and fathers in 
                                                   
25. R (on the application of McDonald) v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, [2011] UKSC 33; 
Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board, [2015] UKSC 11; Amoena (UK) Limited v Commissioners for Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, [2016] UKSC 41. 
26. Hounga v Allen and another, [2014] UKSC 47; Taiwo v Olaigbe and another, [2016] UKSC 31.  
27. Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan, [2014] 68; R (on the application of A and B) v Secretary of State for 
Health, [2017] UKSC 41. 
28. E.g. R (on the application of McDonald) v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, [2011] UKSC 33; Rabone 
and another v Pennine Care NHS Trust, [2012] UKSC 2; R (on the application of KM) (by his mother and litigation 
friend JM)) v Cambridgeshire County Council,  [2012] UKSC 23; Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation 
Trust v James, [2013] UKSC 67. 
29. [2016] UKSC 56, per Lady Hale at [1]. 




parenting and protecting children,31 and gender differences in survivor pensions,32 provision 
of local authority care,33 access to state benefits and welfare reform,34 and the location and 
availability of “approved premises” for offenders released from prison on license.35 In other 
cases a substantive gender issue underlay an ostensibly procedural legal issue. For example 
in Beghal v Director of Public Prosecutions, [2015] UKSC 49, Mrs Beghal, a French national 
ordinarily resident in the UK, was stopped and questioned while passing through 
immigration at East Midlands Airport. She had been visiting Paris with her children, where 
her husband, a French national, was being held on terrorism charges. She refused to answer 
most questions and later pleaded guilty to willfully failing to comply with the requirement to 
answer questions under Schedule 7 the Terrorism Act 2000. While the Court considered, and 
confirmed, the compatibility of the power to stop, search, and detain a person travelling 
through a port or across a border without suspicion with the UK’s obligations under the 
European Convention on Human Rights, we classified this as a gender case as it was clear 
that it also raised issues in relation to the treatment of women, and wives in particular, as 
being guilty by association. Similarly, in R (on the application of Mosley (in substitution of 
Stirling Deceased)) v London Borough of Haringey [2014] UKSC 56, the London Borough of 
Haringey introduced a new scheme for the payment of Council Tax Benefit, under which the 
appellant would have to pay more. While the issue for the Court was whether Haringey’s 
consultation process had met the requirements of procedural fairness, were the new 
                                                   
31. E.g. R (on the application of L) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, [2009] UKSC 3; Principal Reporter v 
K and others (Scotland), [2010] UKSC 56; AR v RN, [2015] UKSC 35; In the matter of EV (A Child) (Scotland), 
[2017] UKSC 15. 
32. In the matter of an application by Denise Brewster for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland), [2017] UKSC 8. 
33. R (on the application of McDonald) v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, [2011] UKSC 33. 
34. R (on the application of Mosley (in substitution of Stirling Deceased)) v London Borough of Haringay, [2014] 
UKSC 56; R (on the application of SG and others) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, [2015] UKSC 16; 
Nzolameso v City of Westminster, [2015] UKSC 22; R (on the application of Carmichael and Rourke) (formerly 
known as MA] and others) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, [2016] UKSC 58. 




scheme to be retained it would have a significantly adverse impact on single mothers living 
with child dependent/s, who were more likely to be in receipt of Council Tax Benefit.36  
Potentially feminist cases included those where the issue in the case itself was non-
feminist, but it was related to, or likely to inform understandings of, a feminist issue. Most 
obviously, this included cases involving discrimination on grounds other than sex or 
pregnancy, but where the interpretation of the law would affect future sex and pregnancy 
discrimination cases.37 We also included in this category cases involving the application of 
the public sector equality duty38 and the right to speak publicly about experiences and 
consequences of sexual abuse.39 Cases raised potential gender issues where the broader 
topic or subject matter predominately affected women, although the particular facts of the 
case at hand did not. Examples included part-time and precarious working,40 and the 
payment or recovery of state benefits. In Manchester City Council v Pinnock, [2010] UKSC 45, 
for example, the question for the Court concerned whether the possession order issued by 
the Council following serious anti-social behaviour by members of the appellant’s family was 
disproportionate and, as such, had violated his right to respect for his home under Article 8 
of the European Convention on Human Rights. We classified this case as raising a potential 
gender issue because, although the tenant involved was the father in this instance, 
                                                   
36. In 2013, single men and women claimed Council Tax Benefit in more or less equal numbers, however ninety-
four percent of single Council Tax Benefit recipients living with one or more child dependant/s were women 
(Department for Work and Pensions, Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit caseload summary statistics: 
February 2013 (2013): https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/housing-benefit-and-council-tax-benefit-
caseload-statistics-published-from-november-2008-to-present. 
37. E.g. Patmalniece v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, [2011] UKSC 11; Homer v Chief Constable of 
West Yorkshire Police, [2012] UKSC 15; Seldon v Clarkson Wright and Jakes (A Partnership), [2012] UKSC 16; X v 
Mid Sussex Citizens Advice Bureau and others, [2012] UKSC 59; Bull and another v Hall and another, [2013] 
UKSC 73; Akerman-Livingstone v Aster Communities Ltd, [2015] UKSC 15. 
38. Hotak v London Borough of Southwark, [2015] UKSC 30. 
39. James Rhodes v OPO (by his litigation friend BHM) and another, [2015] UKSC 32. 
40. E.g. O’Brien v Ministry of Justice, [2010] UKSC 34; Autoclenz Limited v Belcher and Others, [2011] UKSC 41; 




responsibility for the (anti-social) behaviour of family members tends to fall 
disproportionately on women as single mothers.41  
In classifying cases as (potentially) feminist/gender we did not seek to elevate these 
classifications to terms of art. Rather, as noted above, we used them heuristically to help us 
to pinpoint the kinds of cases most apt to elicit feminist judgments. There are clearly 
overlaps between the four groups of cases,42 and others might classify individual cases 
differently. The precise classification of each case does not affect the analysis. Their 
collective purpose was simply to encourage us to think broadly about the kinds of cases in 
which feminist judgments might be found. Where we disagreed as to whether a case should 
be categorized as feminist/gender or not, we returned to the descriptions set out above and 
talked through our reasoning until we reached a consensus. However as noted, the fact that 




In identifying ‘feminist’ reasoning we again took a broad view, based on the literature on 
feminist judging.43 This outlines two forms of feminist judicial approach: substantive and 
                                                   
41. According to a Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government report, in 2016-17, fifty-eight 
percent of Household Reference People in the social rented sector were women. The report continues: “This is 
unsurprising as lower incomes and lone parenting – both of which are more prevalent among women – mean 
women are generally more likely to be eligible for social housing which is allocated on the basis of need”: 
English Housing Survey: Social Rented Sector 2016-17 (2017) at [1.7]. 
42. See, e.g. R (on the application of L) (FC) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, [2009] UKSC 3; R (on the 
application of McDonald) v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, [2011] UKSC 33; O’Brien v Ministry of 
Justice, [2013] UKSC 6; FirstGroup Plc v Paulley, [2017] UKSC 4. 
43. See, in particular, Hunter, “Can Feminist Judges Make a Difference?”, supra n 2; Hunter, ‘An Account of 
Feminist Judging’, supra n 6; Hunter & Tyson, “Justice Betty King”, supra n 7; Hunter, “Feminist Judging in the 
‘Real World’”, supra n 2. Note that we were concerned only to identify feminist judging and judgments. We do 
not take the further step of considering whether Justices who wrote feminist judgments can be classified as 
feminist judges; cf. Beverley Baines, “Must Feminist Judges Self-Identify as Feminists?” in Ulrike Schultz & 




procedural. Substantive feminist reasoning is reasoning which seeks to achieve gender 
justice and/or to implement feminist theoretical or ethical commitments, such as 
substantive equality, relationality, the ethic of care, reproductive justice, inclusivity, 
women’s rights and the elimination of gender bias. Feminist processes of judging are 
methods and techniques which have been observed in decisions by feminist judges. These 
include “asking the woman question” (noting the differential impacts of apparently neutral 
rules on women and men, or on different social groups),44 recounting the facts (“telling the 
story”) in a way that brings previously marginalized experiences to the fore, placing the legal 
issues in their wider social and/or policy context, understanding the specificities of women’s 
lives, paying attention to particularities and avoiding abstraction, believing women’s 
accounts and affirming their experiences of violence and abuse, and citing feminist 
scholarship or feminist ‘common knowledge’.45 Our coding sheet for each judgment listed 
these diverse indicators of feminist reasoning and we noted whether any of them – and if so 
which ones – were present in any of the judgments in the case, as well as detailing how 
exactly these forms of reasoning were deployed or engaged.   
In the course of our reading, we developed the further category of a ‘missed 
opportunity’ for feminist reasoning. This captured judgments in which a judge had gone 
some part of the way toward adopting a feminist approach but had ultimately failed to 
follow through, as discussed further below. 
 
  
                                                   
44 See Katharine T. Bartlett, “Feminist Legal Methods” (1990) 103 Harvard Law Review 829. 




The Data Subset: Feminist/Gender Cases in the UK Supreme Court 
As noted above, our sub-set of feminist/gender cases consisted of 114 cases, around twenty 
percent of the total cases decided by the UKSC during the period of our study. The areas of 
law in which feminist/gender issues arise tend to be areas that involve the interests and 
treatment of individuals rather than corporate entities and areas which touch the lives of 
many women and men.46 The distribution of feminist/gender cases in our subset by areas of 
law is shown in Figure 1. We did not attempt to identify a single or primary category for each 
case but rather assigned cases to as many categories as appeared relevant. Thus, the 
number of cases in Figure 1 sums to more than 114. 
 
Figure 1: Feminist/gender cases by areas of law (n=114) 
 
The ‘Other’ category included cases in banking law (1), constitutional law (1), criminal law (2), data 
protection(1), property law/equity (2) and tax law (1). 
 
                                                   














The notable absences from the areas covered by the UKSC’s feminist/gender cases 
are criminal law and evidence, which have featured prominently in both feminist judgment 
projects and in other empirical studies of feminist judging.47 This is attributable to the nature 
of the UKSC’s caseload. The Court hears very few criminal appeals,48 and where criminal 
cases reach the Court’s docket, they tend to raise procedural or human rights issues rather 
than questions of legal or evidential doctrine. In effect, Courts of Criminal Appeal in the UK’s 
constituent jurisdictions are the final arbiters of criminal cases,49 with permission to appeal 
to the UKSC in criminal cases being relatively rarely granted.    
Every Justice on the Court during our study period sat on at least one of the 
feminist/gender cases we identified, however the cases were not distributed evenly among 
the Justices. Lady Hale sat on by far the largest number of feminist/gender cases. She 
participated in ninety-eight out of the 114 cases (eighty-six percent). Overall, Lady Hale sat 
on fifty-four percent of all cases decided by the Supreme Court during the study period, so it 
can be seen that she was disproportionately like to sit on feminist/gender cases. By contrast, 
for example, Lord Mance, a commercial law specialist appointed to the court from its 
inception alongside Lady Hale, sat on only twenty-four percent of the feminist/gender cases. 
Apart from Lady Hale, those Justices whose representation on feminist/gender cases was 
higher than their representation on all cases were Lords Wilson and Kerr. Lord Wilson is a 
specialist in family law and immigration/asylum law, while Lord Kerr specializes in human 
                                                   
47. See Hunter, McGlynn & Rackley, Feminist Judgments, supra n 1, Part IV; Douglas et al, Australian Feminist 
Judgments, supra n 1, Part III and chapter 27; Enright, McCandless & O’Donoghue, Northern/Irish Feminist 
Judgments, supra n 1, chapters 23, 26, 27 and 29; McDonald et al, Feminist Judgments of Aotearoa, supra n 1, 
Part IV; Women’s Court of Canada, “Rewriting Equality II”, supra n 1; Hunter, “Justice Marcia Neave”, supra n 7; 
Hunter, “Feminist Judging in the ‘Real World’”, supra n 2. 
48. Authors’ data: criminal appeals made up less than five percent of the Court’s caseload in 2009-15. 
49. Scottish criminal cases are finally decided in the Scottish courts as a matter of law (see supra n 8), while in 




rights and criminal procedure, and these specializations are likely to explain their frequent 
presence in feminist/gender cases.    
 As with presence on the bench, most of the Justices wrote the leading judgment 
(either individually or jointly) in at least one feminist/gender case, but some did so much 
more frequently than others. Lady Hale wrote the highest number of leading judgments in 
feminist/gender cases followed by Lord Wilson and Lord Reed. Lord Reed is a generalist with 
a particular specialization in tax law.50 However he is also one of the Court’s more frequent 
writers of leading judgments,51 and this appears to have carried over to the feminist/gender 
cases on which he sat.  
 
Feminist Judgments 
After carefully reading all 114 cases in our data subset and applying the approach to 
identifying feminist reasoning described above, we found feminist reasoning by at least one 
of the Justices in sixty-five cases – that is, in just over half of the feminist/gender cases. 
These sixty-five cases included a total of seventy-three feminist judgments: seventy written 
by single Justices and three joint judgments. Forty of these judgments were leads, thirteen 
were concurrences and twenty were dissents. Thus, it appears that feminist judgments have 
become to some extent ‘mainstream’ on the UKSC in that the majority of those that were 
written constituted the leading judgment in the case. Almost all of the dissenting judgments 
containing feminist reasoning were by either Lady Hale (eleven) or Lord Kerr (six). In fact 
Lord Kerr was more likely to offer feminist reasoning in dissent than when he wrote leading 
(three) or concurring judgments (two). 
                                                   
50. Hunter & Rackley, “Judicial Leadership”, supra n 10 at 211, Table 2.  





The Forms of Feminist Reasoning 
The most popular form of feminist reasoning found in the cases involved an effort to 
contextualize the facts and/or the legal issues, either by specific reference to the lived 
experiences of the parties involved, or by locating them within a wider context or backdrop. 
In R (on the application of Carmichael and Rourke) v Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions, [2016] UKSC 58, for example, Lady Hale used her concurring judgment to draw 
attention to the specific adverse impact that housing benefit cuts introduced by the 
Conservative government would have on women living in sanctuary housing52 – a point not 
noted by Lord Toulson in his leading judgment. The new discretionary housing payment 
scheme: 
produces less certainty; it has a stricter means test; it offers different and less 
attractive routes of judicial challenge; it can be onerous to make applications; and it 
encourages short term, temporary and conditional awards. For a woman in a 
sanctuary scheme to have to endure all those difficulties and uncertainties on top of 
the constant fear and anxiety in which she lives cannot be justified.53  
Similarly, in Cameron Mathieson, a deceased child (by his father Craig Mathieson) v 
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, [2015] UKSC 47, a case involving suspension of a 
                                                   
52. Under the cuts, people judged to be living in houses with more bedrooms than they needed for the size of 
their family had their housing benefits cut to reflect the number of bedrooms deemed necessary. This was 
widely dubbed the “bedroom tax”. Sanctuary housing schemes are arrangements offered to high risk victims of 
domestic violence to increase the safety of their homes, often including a reinforced ‘safe room’ into which 
they can retreat in case of intrusion by their ex-partner. Such ‘safe rooms’ were caught by the “bedroom tax”, 
resulting in survivors of violence having their benefits cut, meaning in many cases they could no longer afford 
to pay the rent or mortgage on their sanctuary house. A safety-net accompanying the cuts allowed local 
authorities to provide additional funding to some benefit recipients in cases of hardship, on a discretionary 
basis. However as Hale noted, access to this funding was far less secure and more onerous than the previous 
benefit provisions. 




child’s disability living allowance due to his extended stay in hospital, Lord Wilson 
demonstrated that this was not a hard or atypical case by referring to a number of surveys 
which showed that the vast majority of parents not only provided no lesser level of care 
when their children were in hospital but suffered increased costs in order to do so.54 By 
contrast, Lord Mance in his concurring judgment in this case, based his reasoning on a 
narrower analysis of whether the Regulations treating hospitalized children differently from 
those not requiring hospitalization met the test of justification. He warned that courts 
should not be over-ready to criticize social security legislation, that lines had to be drawn 
which may not cater for every situation, and stated that he had found the case more finely 
balanced than Lord Wilson suggested.55 
 On other occasions, the exposition and analysis of the legal issues was supplemented 
by an expanded account of the facts of the case which demonstrated understanding of and 
empathy with the litigants’ experience. This might take the form of giving a name to a 
previously un-named party – “we are concerned with a little girl, whom I shall call Amelia”56 
– or taking the time to acknowledge the grief of a parent who had lost a child: 
In this day and age we all expect our children to outlive us. Losing a child prematurely 
is agony. No-one who reads the hospital’s notes of the series of telephone calls made 
by this patient’s father to the hospital on the night in question can be in any doubt of 
that.57 
Another relatively frequent form of feminist reasoning utilized by the Justices in our 
data subset involved efforts to prevent or remedy injustice, for example by drawing 
                                                   
54. [2015] UKSC 47 at [31]-[36]. 
55 Ibid at [50]-[51]. 
56. In the matter of B (A Child), [2013] UKSC 33 at [146] per Lady Hale.   




attention to the impact of the decision on specific or disadvantaged groups, including 
references to historical injustice,58 or by challenging gender bias.59 Gow v Grant (Scotland), 
[2012] UKSC 29, for example, was a case involving the provision of financial support by one 
former cohabitant to the other after the breakdown of their relationship. While Lord Hope’s 
leading judgment focused on the application of the Scottish law to the facts of the case, Lady 
Hale used her concurring judgment to call for similar law reform in England and Wales to 
provide urgently needed financial remedies for cohabitants following relationship 
breakdown, and drew attention to the variety of sources of disadvantage which any new law 
would need to address: 
There is a tendency to concentrate upon the younger couples who have children, 
where one of them suffers financial disadvantage as a result of having to look after 
the children both during and after the relationship … This case is an example of such 
disadvantages arising in a completely different context, but one which is by no means 
uncommon these days: a mature couple, both of whom have been married before, 
each of whom has a home and an income from pensions or employment, but where 
one of them gives up her home and at least some of her income as a result of their 
living together (an occupational widow’s pension, for example…). At the end of the 
relationship, one of them may be markedly less well off than she was at the 
beginning, whereas the other may be in much the same position as he was before or 
even somewhat better off.60  
                                                   
58. See, e.g., Royal Bank of Scotland v John Patrick McCormack Wilson and another (Scotland), [2010] UKSC 50; 
Principal Reporter v K and others (Scotland), [2010] UKSC 56; R (on the application of Gujra) v Crown 
Prosecution Service, [2012] UKSC 52; R (on the application of A and B) v Secretary of State for Health, [2017] 
UKSC 41. 
59. See, e.g., Radmacher v Granatino, [2010] UKSC 42; In the matter of J (Children), [2013] UKSC 9; In the matter 
of B (A Child), [2013] UKSC 33; North and others v Dumfries and Galloway Council (Scotland), [2013] UKSC 45; R 
(on the application of Coll) v Secretary of State for Justice, [2017] UKSC 40. 




The use by judges of obiter comments to make a feminist point, as Hale does here, is 
a technique observed within the feminist judgments projects,61 which we also found in 
several of the judgments in our UKSC data subset. The Justices made use of obiter 
comments, for example, in order to highlight the responsibility of public authorities, to note 
arguments that could have been but were not made by one or other of the parties, to draw 
attention to the broader implications of their judgment on related issues, or, where the 
decision was on a procedural matter, to express a view on how the substantive issue should 
be decided when it went to trial.62 Some also used the opportunity to express 
disappointment with or disapproval of a compelled conclusion – “If there were any way in 
which we could legitimately rewrite the rule to produce a fairer result, I could see a 
persuasive case for doing so. Unfortunately I do not think this possible”.63  
Other feminist judgments demonstrate an understanding of the realities of women’s 
lives, particularly, but not only, in relation to family relationships and domestic abuse, 64 or 
make women or gender issues visible within the narrative of the judgment. In O’Brien v 
Ministry of Justice, [2013] UKSC 6, for example, Lord Hope and Lady Hale in their discussion 
(and demolition) of the reasons advanced by the Ministry of Justice for not paying pensions 
to Recorders,65 refer to the often gendered effects of discrimination against part-time 
                                                   
61 See, e.g., Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn & Erika Rackley, “Feminist Judgments: An Introduction”, in 
Hunter, McGlynn & Rackley, eds, Feminist Judgments, supra n 1 at 14. 
62. See, e.g., Re K (A Child) (Northern Ireland), [2014] UKSC 29; Wyatt v Vince, [2015] UKSC 14; R (Ali) and R (Bibi) 
v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2015] UKSC 68; R (on the application of Johnson) v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department, [2016] UKSC 56. 
63. AA (Somalia) v Entry Clearance Officer (Addis Ababa), [2013] UKSC 81 at [13] per Lord Carnwath. See also 
Taiwo v Olaigbe, [2016] UKSC 31. 
64. See, e.g., Yemshaw v London Borough of Hounslow, [2011] UKSC 3; Jessy Saint-Prix v Secretary of State for 
Work and Pensions, [2012] UKSC 49; In the matter of B (A Child), [2013] UKSC 33; Michael and others v Chief 
Constable of South Wales Police and another, [2015] UKSC 2; Sharland v Sharland, [2015] UKSC 60; R (on the 
application of Carmichael and Rourke) (formerly known as MA and others) v Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions, [2016] UKSC 58. 
65 A Recorder in England and Wales is a part-time (fee-paid) judge sitting in the County Court (civil jurisdiction) 




workers and use analogies from feminized areas of part-time work, such as supply teachers 
and agency nurses.66 On other occasions feminist reasoning was more legalistic, for example, 
where the Justices adopted a purposive approach to the interpretation of progressive 
legislation,67 or presented a potentially contentious (feminist) issue as a “matter of statutory 
interpretation”.68 
Finally, we found instances where Justices made use of feminist ‘common 
knowledge’, that is, general feminist knowledge about women’s lives for which no evidence 
is required. Examples included knowledge about domestic violence and abuse,69 experiences 
of pregnancy (including pregnancy and sex discrimination) and childbirth,70 parenting and 
family life,71 relative economic bargaining power,72 and the vulnerability of victims of sexual 
violence.73 In several cases Justices referred to feminist legal scholarship to underline their 
argument and/or approach.74 While intersectionality was not a prominent strand of feminist 
reasoning within our sample, largely because relatively few of the feminist/gender cases 
raised intersectional issues, there were a handful of instances of such reasoning. For 
example R (on the application of McDonald) v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, 
[2011] UKSC 33 concerned the question of whether a local government care package for an 
elderly lady could include the provision of incontinence pads at night rather than assistance 
                                                   
66. [2013] UKSC 6 at [58]. 
67. See, e.g., North and others v Dumfries and Galloway Council (Scotland), [2013] UKSC 45; South Lanarkshire 
Council v The Scottish Information Commissioner, [2013] UKSC 55; Bull and another v Hall and another, [2013] 
UKSC 73; Akerman-Livingstone v Aster Communities Ltd, [2015] UKSC 15. 
68. Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan, [2014] UKSC 68. 
69. Yemshaw v London Borough of Hounslow, [2011] UKSC 3. 
70. Jessy Saint-Prix v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, [2012] UKSC 49; Montgomery v Lanarkshire 
Health Board, [2015] UKSC 11. 
71. Rabone and another v Pennine Care NHS Trust, [2012] UKSC 2; Humphreys v The Commissioners for Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, [2012] UKSC 18.  
72. Radmacher v Granatino, [2010] UKSC 42. 
73. R (on the application of Gujra) v Crown Prosecution Service, [2012] 52 at [126]. 
74. See, eg, HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2010] UKSC 31; ZH 
(Tanzania) (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2011] UKSC 4; R (on the application of A and B) 




to go to the toilet, and Lady Hale’s dissenting judgment (unlike those of her colleagues) 
specifically addresses the intersection of gender with age and disability in this case. Taiwo v 
Olaigbe, [2016] UKSC 31 concerned whether the mistreatment of migrant domestic workers 
by their employer fell within the racial discrimination provisions of the Equality Act 2010, 
and in her leading judgment Lady Hale refers to literature which identifies the particular 
vulnerability of domestic workers with precarious immigration status, the majority of whom 
are women.75 And in EM (Eritrea)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2014] 
UKSC 12 Lord Kerr recognizes the particular embodied experiences of women asylum 
seekers when assessing their risk of inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.  
We noted ‘missed opportunities’ for feminist reasoning in fifteen of the 
feminist/gender cases. For example in Amoena (UK) Ltd v Commissioners for Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs, [2016] UKSC 41, the question was whether a mastectomy bra should 
be classified for tax law purposes as a bra, or as an “orthopaedic appliance”, “artificial part 
of the body” or “other appliance…worn…to compensate for a defect or disability”. In the 
former case customs duty would be payable but in the latter case not. While the court 
unanimously decided that the bra was an accessory for which no duty was payable, Lord 
Carnwath’s leading judgment engages only minimally with the purpose and importance of a 
mastectomy bra. Apart from one brief reference to “lessening the psychological impact of 
having had the mastectomy”,76 the judgment prefers the relative safety of analogies with 
catheter drainage bags and printer cartridges.  
                                                   
75 Taiwo v Olaigbe, [2016] UKSC 31 at [25]. 




As indicated in the above discussion, feminist judgments often stood out by contrast 
with non-feminist judgments in the same case, because they used identified techniques of 
feminist judging which other judgments did not use, and/or because they engaged with the 
substantive feminist/gender issues in the case while other judgments failed to do so. Other 
very clear illustrations of this contrast are found in the cases of Yemshaw v London Borough 
of Hounslow, [2011] UKSC 3 and Radmacher v Granatino, [2010] UKSC 42. In Yemshaw, the 
appellant argued that she had been made homeless as a result of domestic violence, 
triggering the Local Authority’s duty under the Housing Act 1996 to re-house her. Her case 
hinged on the meaning of the term “domestic violence” in the legislation. Previous case law 
had confined the term to mean only physical violence. However in her leading judgment, 
Lady Hale extended its scope to encompass other forms of domestic abuse such as 
threatening behaviour, and psychological, emotional and financial abuse, in accordance with 
developing national and international understandings of domestic violence. In the same case 
Lord Brown delivered a concurring judgment in which he expressed considerable doubt as to 
whether the meaning of “violence” should be extended in this way. His judgment reflects 
deference to precedent and adherence to the traditional legal view of the concept of 
“violence”, uninformed by decades of feminist theorizing, activism and law-making on the 
subject of domestic abuse. Yet he did not entirely reject Hale’s reasoning, and ultimately 
concluded that his doubts did not carry him to the point of dissent.77 In Radmacher, on the 
other hand, Hale’s reasoning about the gendered impact of pre-nuptial contracts did not 
persuade the rest of the Court and she became the sole dissenter. The majority decided that 
pre-nuptial contracts should be recognized and given effect in English law, on classic liberal 
                                                   




grounds of liberty and autonomy,78 and by analogy with any other kind of contract. Only 
Hale observed the salient differences between pre-nuptial contracts and arm’s length 
commercial contracts, and the typical effects of such contracts on the equality interests of 
economically weaker spouses, who were usually (though not invariably) women.79  
In ‘missed opportunity’ cases such as Amoena, it can be seen that the Justice offers a 
hint of engagement with the feminist/gender issues in the case, but quickly retreats from 
that engagement. In the approximately one third of the feminist/gender cases in which we 
found no feminist reasoning, none of the Justices engaged with the (potentially) 
feminist/gender issues raised by the case or deployed any of the techniques of feminist 
judging in their judgments. 
Where feminist reasoning was present, it is notable that procedural rather than 
substantive approaches predominated. Contextualization, displaying understanding and 
empathy with litigants, making obiter comments about matters not strictly before the Court, 
understanding the realities of women’s lives, making women or gender impacts visible in 
judgments, deploying feminist common knowledge and referring to feminist legal 
scholarship are all identified techniques of feminist judging, but they are primarily discursive 
strategies. They offer inclusivity in the way the judgment is written. Often they operate to 
lay the groundwork for a result which shifts power or material resources towards the 
excluded or marginalized group, but this is not always or inevitably the case. The only 
substantive approach to feminist judging which occurred at all frequently in the cases was 
that of seeking to remedy injustices, which clearly does entail an impact on the outcome of 
the case. 
                                                   
78 Radmacher v Granatino, [2010] UKSC 42 per Lords Phillips, Hope, Rodger, Walker, Brown, Collins and Kerr at 
[78]. 




It is notable, too, that many of these frequently occurring forms of feminist judging 
are not necessarily exclusive to a feminist approach, but may equally be deployed in pursuit 
of other social justice agendas or a broader ‘humanist’ philosophy. This applies to 
techniques of contextualization, demonstrating understanding and empathy, making obiter 
comments, seeking to remedy injustices, and possibly even references to feminist legal 
scholarship.80  Forms of feminist judgment that might be identified as unique to feminism, 
such as understanding the realities of women’s lives, making women or gender impacts 
visible in judgments and deploying feminist common knowledge were found less often 
amongst the feminist judgments in our dataset. We do not conclude from this that our 
definition of feminist judging is overly broad. All of the techniques and strategies referred to 
have been previously identified as elements of feminist judging, and they often occurred 
together in particular judgments rather than in isolation. Moreover, we do not believe that 
the ‘feminist’ label is only applicable to any ‘pure’ residue remaining after all other 
possibilities have been excluded.81 Rather, we would argue that because of its broadly 
inclusionary commitments, some elements of feminist judging – and particularly its 
procedural elements – are likely to appeal to and to be adopted by judges who share those 
commitments for whatever reason, whether generally or in the circumstances of a particular 
case.        
 
  
                                                   
80 See, e.g., HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2010] UKSC 31, per 
Lord Walker at [92]-[93] and Sir John Dyson at [112], citing Jenni Millbank, “From Discretion to Disbelief: 
Recent Trends in Refugee Determinations on the Basis of Sexual Orientation in Australia and the United 
Kingdom” (2009) 13 International Journal of Human Rights 31 concerning the treatment of gay and lesbian 
asylum seekers. 
81 See Rosemary Hunter, Sharyn Roach Anleu and Kathy Mack, “Judging in Lower Courts: Distinguishing 
Conventional, Procedural, Therapeutic and Feminist Approaches” (2016) 12 International Journal of Law in 




The Feminist Judgment-Writers 
Unsurprisingly, Lady Hale was responsible for the great majority of feminist reasoning found 
in our data subset, either as the only Justice in the case to employ feminist reasoning (in 
thirty-four cases) or alongside other Justices who also employed it (in a further eleven 
cases). The latter group of cases comprised three judgments jointly authored by Hale and 
another Justice, and eight cases in which Lady Hale and another Justice used feminist 
reasoning in separate judgments. Twenty cases included feminist reasoning by another 
Justice without any contribution from Lady Hale. Among these, Lords Kerr and Wilson 
featured the most heavily, being the only Justice in the case to offer feminist reasoning in six 
cases each. Overall Lady Hale (forty-two) and Lords Kerr (eleven) and Wilson (eight) were the 
only Justices to author more than five feminist judgments. 
The majority of Lady Hale’s judgments with feminist reasoning were leading 
judgments (twenty-seven), with eleven concurrences and five dissents. Cases in which Lady 
Hale gave feminist reasoning included well-known feminist ‘set pieces’ such as her 
judgments discussed above in Yemshaw (domestic violence), McDonald (incontinence pads), 
Radmacher v (prenuptial agreements) and Carmichael (housing benefit cuts), and her 
concurrence in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board, [2015] UKSC 11 (on the standard of 
care expected of doctors advising women about risks and options in relation to childbirth). It 
is notable that a number of Lady Hale’s ‘set pieces’ have been dissents, providing a 
misleading picture of her feminist influence on the Court.82 In fact, we found a larger 
number of less high profile leading judgments in which Lady Hale offered feminist reasoning, 
                                                   
82 Certainly she is not – in contrast to female comparators on other apex Courts – a “great dissenter” (see 
Hunter & Rackley, “Judicial Leadership”, supra n 10 at 200-20; cf Marie-Claire Belleau and Rebecca Johnson, 
“Judging Gender: Difference and Dissent at the Supreme Court of Canada” (2008) 15 International Journal of 




in relation to housing and welfare benefits, matrimonial property and reproductive justice, 
as well as in cases concerning discrimination law, employment law (particularly on part-time 
workers and equal pay), parents and children, the right to family life in immigration law and 
in cases of threatened extradition, positive duties of the state under the Human Rights Act, 
and access to justice.  
 Lord Kerr’s and Lord Wilson’s feminist reasoning occurred in very similar kinds of 
cases to (and sometimes the same cases as) Lady Hale’s, although Lord Kerr’s feminist 
reasoning tended to be more work, crime, benefits and torts-related,83 while Lord Wilson’s 
tended to be more related to children and family law or family life,84 although he also 
delivered strongly-worded judgments employing feminist reasoning in two modern slavery 
cases concerning the ill-treatment of foreign domestic workers.85  
Where feminist reasoning was given by both Lady Hale and another Justice, they did 
not necessarily adopt the same (feminist) approach. One interesting example of this 
difference was found in Re K (A Child) (Northern Ireland), [2014] UKSC 29. K was a seven-
year-old child who had lived with his maternal grandparents in Lithuania since his birth. In 
2006 his mother had moved to Northern Ireland, leaving K with the grandparents by 
agreement, and in 2007 a court awarded them temporary care of K. By 2012 the mother 
wanted K to live with her in Northern Ireland but the grandparents did not agree. Aware that 
a custody challenge would be expensive, she took K from school and left the country with 
him. The evidence was that K was now thriving in his mother’s care but the grandparents 
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sought his return, and the legal question was whether they had “rights of custody” within 
the meaning of the Hague Convention and Brussels II Regulations governing international 
child abduction. Lady Hale was extremely critical of the mother’s actions in attempting to 
circumvent the law and held that the grandparents did have rights of custody and K should 
be returned to Lithuania. But she was clearly also mindful of the fact that K was now settled 
and well cared for in Northern Ireland, and stayed her judgment to give the mother an 
opportunity to regain lawful custody of her child, explaining the steps she needed to take in 
order to do so. Lord Wilson, in dissent, would have held that the grandparents’ rights of 
custody terminated on the mother’s return to Lithuania. He also placed more emphasis on 
the current welfare of the child than on the mother’s past behaviour.  Both judges, 
therefore, are concerned not simply to interpret and apply the law in the abstract, but 
concretely to achieve a result that promotes the child’s welfare, and both recognize that the 
child’s welfare is integrally bound up in his relationship with his mother. We therefore 
identified them both as feminist judgments, as they both adopted the feminist theoretical 
commitment to relationality. But while Lord Wilson found a direct route to the expression of 
this commitment (by his interpretation of “rights of custody”), Lady Hale’s feminist 
reasoning was complicated by other commitments (to her view of the law and her 
disapproval of the mother’s law-breaking), resulting ultimately in a compromise with herself 
to allow for the expression of all of these commitments.  
 Another case which involved different feminist reasoning was Michael and others v 
Chief Constable of South Wales Police and others, [2015] UKSC 2. In this case Ms Michael had 
been murdered by her violent partner, although her death might have been prevented had 
police responded promptly to her 999 call. Her parents and children brought claims for 




Ms Michael a duty of care in these circumstances. The majority held that they did not and 
that the claims should be struck out. In separate dissenting judgments, Lord Kerr and Lady 
Hale explained why they would have upheld the appeals. Lord Kerr’s focus was on 
remedying injustice in the particular case, and on the particularity of Ms Michael’s 
experience as a highly vulnerable and frightened victim of domestic abuse. In his view, if the 
police knew of an imminent threat of serious harm to a particular individual calling for 
urgent action, and had the means of preventing that threat and protecting the individual 
concerned, they should owe a duty of care and be liable if it was breached. Lady Hale, on the 
other hand, placed the issue in the broader context of documented inadequacies in police 
responses to domestic abuse. In these circumstances, the imposition of liability in negligence 
could lead to improvement in those responses and help to counter dismissive police 
attitudes towards domestic abuse.   
 
The Value of Feminist Judgments 
As the above discussion demonstrates, our analysis of cases raising (potential) feminist or 
gender issues reinforces the value of feminist judging in terms of both discursive inclusivity 
and substantive justice. Substantively, in at least some cases, injustices were remedied, 
gendered disadvantages and biases were identified and addressed, regulations based on 
false premises were struck down, and progressive legislation was interpreted purposively. 
Evidence that these outcomes would not have occurred in the absence of feminist reasoning 
may be found in non-feminist dissenting judgments in the same cases which would have 
decided otherwise. Feminist dissenting judgments in cases where the majority’s non-
feminist reasoning led to a result which failed to address gender bias or disadvantage also 




configurations of power and advantage were reinforced and injustices were not remedied 
arguably due to the absence of feminist reasoning by any of the Justices.  
 Examples of cases where feminist reasoning was entirely absent but could have 
made a difference to the result included Norris v Government of the United States of 
America, [2010] UKSC 9 and Mirga v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2016] UKSC 1. 
In Norris, Mr Norris sought to resist extradition to the USA on the basis that it would cause 
disproportionate interference with his and his wife’s right to respect for their private and 
family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. His wife had a 
psychiatric condition which prevented her from travelling to the USA, but if he was deported 
she would lose his support in the UK on which she relied. A feminist judge might have 
demonstrated an understanding of the importance of relational support for individual 
wellbeing and the exceptional harm Mrs Norris would suffer as a result of Mr Norris’s 
deportation. But the Court found the threshold of an exceptionally serious interference with 
Article 8 was not reached and authorized Mr Norris’s extradition. In Mirga, Ms Mirga was an 
EU national who was entitled to claim benefits in the UK only after having worked in the UK 
for a period of twelve months. She had worked for seven months but then left work due to 
her pregnancy. Lord Neuberger, with whom the other members of the Court agreed, 
delivered a technical legal judgment which failed to consider the impact of pregnancy on 
workers’ rights or the generally more interrupted patterns of women’s workforce 
participation due to family responsibilities, and Ms Mirga’s claim was dismissed. Again, a 
feminist judgment might have reached a different conclusion. 
 It must also be acknowledged that in some cases, a substantive feminist outcome 
was reached without any assistance from feminist reasoning. For example in Child Poverty 




for Work and Pensions had aggressively sought to recover benefit overpayments caused by 
the Department’s error, without a statutory basis for doing so. While this was a gender issue 
in that women were the majority of recipients of benefits and the targets of overpayment 
recovery, the Court reached its decision that the money had been recovered from recipients 
unlawfully and should be repaid to them on the basis of statutory interpretation and the 
principles of restitution, with none of the judgments referring to the gendered effect of the 
Department’s actions. In McDonald v Newton or McDonald, [2017] UKSC 52, Lord Hodge, 
with whom the other members of the court agreed, arrived at a broad interpretation of the 
concept of “matrimonial property” in the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 by reference to the 
Act’s stated aims and principles, without any acknowledgement that those principles were 
designed largely to protect wives from financial disadvantage following divorce, or of the 
gendered significance of the Court’s decision. Similarly, in Hewage v Grampian Health Board 
(Scotland), [2012] UKSC 37, the complainant, who was of Sri Lankan origin, had been 
harassed and bullied at work leading to her constructive dismissal. She brought sex and race 
discrimination claims and succeeded in the Employment Tribunal (ET). That decision was 
overturned by the Employment Appeal Tribunal, but the Inner House of the Court of Session 
(the Scottish Court of Appeal) had upheld her appeal and remitted the matter to the ET. The 
employer now appealed to the UKSC. Lord Hope’s judgment focuses on whether the ET’s 
reasoning on appropriate comparators and tests for discrimination was correct and finds 
that it was, rejecting the employer’s appeal, without mentioning intersectionality or the 
wider purpose of anti-discrimination law.  
These cases are akin to those involving a feminist concurring judgment, where the 
same result would have been reached with or without the feminist reasoning. Such cases 




directives already established by the European Court of Human Rights, and where gender 
injustice arose from breaches of or attempts to circumvent the law, which the Court had no 
difficulty in correcting. In these situations, feminist judgments did not contribute to the 
achievement of substantively just and inclusive outcomes. But they could still be valuable (as 
concurrences) in contributing feminist reasoning to highlight the gendered context and 
consequences of decisions and to provide legal recognition to the previously excluded. 
As discussed above, discursive inclusion was found more commonly than substantive 
feminist reasoning in the feminist judgments within our data subset. But even in cases 
where the result appeared inevitable, feminist reasoning enriched the judicial discourse by 
demonstrating understanding of and empathy for litigants, making women and gender 
issues visible, and transforming feminist knowledge into legal knowledge. Discursive 
inclusion could, also, indirectly, help to produce substantively inclusive results. In cases 
which could have been decided either way, facts were understood in their wider (gendered) 
social context, and the law was extended to incorporate the experiences of marginalized and 
disadvantaged groups. Moreover, feminist dissenting judgments which drew attention to 
ways in which the law was unnecessarily limited or produced unjust results, laid down 
important markers for future reference. Notably, feminist judgments typically spoke to a 
larger audience than the individual parties involved in the case, and thus they helped to 
connect the Court to the wider context in which it operates and the public it serves.    
 
Conclusion 
In response to the assumptions made by feminist judgments projects about the extent and 
value of ‘real world’ feminist judging, we set out to answer three research questions: who 




and what is its value? In order to answer these questions we focused our detailed analysis 
on a subset of UKSC cases which raised (potential) feminist or gender issues. The sixty-five 
cases including feminist reasoning we identified make up a small proportion of the Court’s 
total decisions during the period of the study. While our methodology means that this figure 
cannot be definitive, we consider it to be fairly indicative of the scale, scope and nature of 
feminist judgment-writing on the Court during that period.  
In answer to the first question, it appears that just about every Justice may write the 
occasional feminist judgment, but those likely to do so with any degree of regularity are 
those who are feminists (Lady Hale) and those who share feminism’s social justice and 
inclusionary concerns (Lord Kerr and Lord Wilson). By taking a systematic approach, we 
discovered a number of leading feminist judgments given by Lady Hale which had not 
received much public attention, and we discovered feminist judgments given by Lord Kerr 
and Lord Wilson which have likewise hitherto remained below the feminist radar.  
In answer to the second question, feminist judging on the UKSC appears to be largely 
procedural. It involves techniques and strategies associated with feminist judging rather 
than necessarily aiming to achieve substantive gender justice. Nevertheless, a proportion of 
feminist judgments did have this aim, and in a proportion of cases, as leading judgments, 
they both succeeded and commanded the agreement of the Court as a whole. Feminist 
judgments on the UKSC are certainly not confined to dissents.  
Likewise, the answer to our third question –  the value of feminist judgments –  
appears to be primarily discursive. At this level, feminist judgments always make a 
difference, regardless of the result of the case, by drawing attention to the gendered 
operations of law and its social context, by writing marginalized experiences and subjugated 




legal developments. The picture is more complicated with regard to whether feminist 
judgments make a substantive difference.  Where statute and case law already reflects 
feminist principles, feminist reasoning is not always necessary to the achievement of a 
gender-just, social justice or otherwise inclusive result. However there remain many 
instances where this is not the case. In such instances, feminist judgments can make a 
substantive difference in redistributing power and material resources away from their 
established holders towards those who have been previously disadvantaged.  
Taken together, our findings suggest that while feminist judgments may play an 
important role in the pursuit of substantive gender justice, they are not a panacea. Feminist 
judgment writing – as with all judgment writing – is often constrained, usually personality 
dependant and sometimes flawed. They tell us again that who the judge is matters, and that 
feminism should matter to judges. And they tell us that there are still a significant number of 
cases raising feminist or gender issues that call out for feminist rewriting.  
 These findings, of course, raise further questions. One is about forms of feminist 
reasoning which were not evident in the UKSC’s feminist judgments. The feminist judgment 
projects, for example, have brought to bear a much wider range of feminist theoretical 
positions than we found in the UKSC cases. Does this suggest that ‘real world’ feminist 
judgments are inherently limited in the range of reasoning they can realistically adopt, or 
does the limitation observed simply reside in the judges and/or the cases within our data 
subset? Further research is necessary to explore this question. 
A second question relates to the perennial debate about feminist engagement with 
law reform. If substantively feminist outcomes can follow from the application of 
progressive legislation without the assistance of feminist reasoning, then arguably, achieving 




marginalized litigants than the writing of feminist judgments. Progressive laws can be 
applied by any judge, whereas the converse is not true: feminist judgments cannot produce 
inclusive results from exclusionary statutes. On the other hand, there is always the risk that 
a hostile judge may deploy tools of statutory interpretation to thwart the intentions of 
progressive legislation. And feminist judgments are crucial to the progressive development 
of case law and common law. Furthermore, beyond the interests of individual litigants, the 
presence or absence of feminist reasoning impacts on legal discourse, legal education, and 
potentially on future litigants. It is clearly not a matter of either/or but of both/and. 
A final question concerns the future of feminist judging on the UKSC. Lady Hale will 
be retiring in January 2020, and Lord Wilson will follow a few months later. Thus two of the 
three Justices who have done most of the feminist heavy lifting on the Court will be gone. 
Lord Kerr will remain for another three years. Lord Reed, who relatively frequently sat on 
and wrote leading judgments in feminist/gender cases, but who sole-authored only one 
judgment employing feminist reasoning, has been named as the next President of the Court. 
What of the newer appointments to the Court? Our analysis did not include the two recently 
appointed women, Lady Black and Lady Arden. Lady Black (like Lady Hale and Lord Wilson) 
has a background in family law, while Lady Arden’s background is in commercial law and 
equity. Neither self-identifies as a feminist and while both delivered gender-sensitive 
judgments on occasions in the Court of Appeal,86 both have reputations more as formalists 
than as judicial activists. Among the men appointed to the Court subsequent to the end of 
our study period (Lords Lloyd-Jones, Briggs, Kitchin, Sales, Hamblen, Leggatt and Burrows), 
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the majority have commercial law backgrounds and no known feminist, human rights or 
social justice credentials.  
It may be that an era of feminist judging on the UKSC is coming to an end, and we will 
have to rely for some time on the hope of feminist and social justice outcomes from the 
application of progressive laws. But these speculations once more rest on public perceptions 
based on high profile decisions rather than systematic analysis. Our ongoing project is to 
monitor UKSC judgments under the Presidency of Lady Hale and beyond to explore these 
questions further. We hope that others will contribute similar research from their own 
jurisdictions. To the extent that there continues to be a paucity of ‘real world’ feminist 
judgments, however, past, present and future feminist judgment projects will continue to 
show how feminist judging can – and should – be done.  
 
 
 
 
